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In this paper, we present what is to our knowledge the first theoretical economic analysis of CO2-
enhanced oil recovery (EOR). This technique, which has been used successfully in a number of oil
plays (notably in West Texas, Wyoming, and Saskatchewan), entails injection of CO2 into mature
oil fields in a manner that reduces the oil's viscosity, thereby enhancing the rate of extraction. As part
of this process, significant quantities of CO2 remain sequestered in the reservoir. If CO2 emissions
are regulated, oil producers using EOR should therefore be able to earn sequestration credits in addition
to oil revenues. We develop a theoretical framework that analyzes the dynamic co-optimization of
oil extraction and CO2 sequestration, through the producer's choice at each point in time of an optimal
CO2 fraction in the injection stream (the control variable). We find that the optimal fraction is likely
to decline monotonically over time, and reach zero before the optimal termination time. Numerical
simulations, based on an ongoing EOR project in Wyoming, confirm this result. They show also that
cumulative sequestration is positively related to the oil price, and is in fact much more responsive
to oil-price increases than to increases in the carbon tax. Only at very high taxes does a tradeoff between
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1. Introduction
There is a growing consensus in both policy circles and in the energy industry that within
the next few years, the US Federal government will adopt some form of regulation of CO2
emissions.1 At the same time, it is widely believed that much of the nation's energy supply
over the coming decades will continue to come from fossil fuels, coal in particular (MIT; 2007).
Many analysts believe the only way to reconcile the anticipated growth in the use of coal with
anticipated limits on CO2 emissions is through the development and deployment of carbon
capture and geological sequestration (CCS). There seems to be broad agreement, moreover,
that large-scale deployment of geological sequestration is likely to start with projects that
apply CO2-enhanced oil recovery (EOR).2
This technique, which has been used successfully in a number of oil plays (notably
in West Texas, Wyoming, and Saskatchewan), entails injection of CO2 into mature oil elds
in a manner that causes the CO2 to mix with some fraction of the oil that still remains
underground. Doing so reduces the oil's viscosity, thereby improving its ability to ow
through the reservoir rock, and enhancing the rate of extraction.3 Although some of the
CO2 resurfaces with the oil, it can be separated from the output stream, recompressed,
and reinjected. Eventually, when the EOR project is terminated, all the injected CO2 is
sequestered.
EOR is a \game-changing" technology for the recovery of oil from depleted reserves.
Estimates suggest that recovery rates for existing reserves could be approximately doubled,
while the application of EOR on a broad scale could raise domestic recoverable oil reserves in
1For example, the Vice President of Environmental Policy for Duke Energy stated in a Washington Post
article, \Our viewpoint is that it's going to happen. There's scientic evidence of climate change. We'd like
to know what legislation will be put together so that, when we gure out how to increase our load, we know
exactly what to expect." (Steven Mufson and Juliet Eilperin, \Energy Firms Come to Terms With Climate
Change," Washington Post, Saturday, November 25, 2005, p. A01)
2This view was expressed in recent Congressional testimony by George Peridas, Science Fellow at the National
Resources Defense Council, who said that CO2-EOR \has a substantial immediate- to long-term role to play
in both increasing domestic oil production in a responsible way, and in sequestering CO2" (Peridas; 2008).
See also the Congressional testimony by William L. Townsend (Townsend; 2007) and the National Petroleum
Council report Hard Truths: Facing the Hard Truths About Energy (NPC; 2007).
3Other methods of enhanced oil recovery exist as well, including injection of steam, nitrogen, methane, and
various polymers. Because these methods are not the focus of this paper, we use the term enhanced oil
recovery, or EOR, as shorthand for CO2-enhanced oil recovery.3
the United States by over 80 billion barrels (ARI; 2006). Similarly, Shaw and Bachu (2003)
claim that 4,470 elds, just over half of the known oil reservoirs in Alberta, are amenable to
CO2 injection for enhanced oil recovery. Babadagli (2006) states that enhanced oil recovery
applied in these reservoirs could translate in an additional 165 billion barrels of oil recovered
and over 1 Gt of CO2 sequestration. Snyder et al. (2008) estimate that at current oil and
carbon prices and with current technology, approximately half of this capacity is economically
viable.
In this paper, we present what is to our knowledge the rst theoretical economic
analysis of CO2-enhanced oil recovery. In the tradition of Hotelling (1931), an oil eld
contains a physical quantity of oil which the producer seeks to extract at a particular rate
over time so as to maximize the economic rents from extraction. The ability to enhance
oil extraction rates through injection of CO2 alters this extraction problem in a number of
non-trivial ways.
First, CO2 is not a costless input. Signicant up-front investments are required
to make production and injection wells suitable for CO2 use. In addition, maintaining a
given injection rate over time requires continuous purchases to make up for the fraction of
injected CO2 that remains sequestered in the reservoir. Separating the remaining fraction
that resurfaces with the produced oil, and then dehydrating and recompressing it, is costly
as well.
Second, even at a constant injection rate, the amount of oil recovered declines over
time, as does the fraction of injected CO2 that remains sequestered in the reservoir. Both
the producer's revenue stream and cost stream are therefore time varying.
Third, while sequestration of CO2 currently yields no economic benets in juris-
dictions without carbon emissions restrictions, future regulations of CO2 emissions in the
context of climate-change policies may generate such benets if EOR projects are allowed to
earn credits for units of CO2 sequestered. The producer's objective would then be the maxi-
mization of the combined revenue streams from both oil production and CO2 sequestration,
net of CO2 purchase and recycling costs.4
Fourth, carbon taxes aect these revenue and cost streams in multiple ways. While a
carbon tax eectively reduces the input cost for EOR and increases the net present value of
the CO2-storage potential of the oil eld, the incidence of the tax on the price of oil reduces
the value of the traditional use of the asset.
Fifth, in addition to these economic tradeos, uid-dynamic interactions of CO2,
water, and oil inside the reservoir give rise to a further, physical tradeo faced by the pro-
ducer. Whereas injecting pure CO2 maximizes oil recovery from the area of the reservoir
that the CO2 sweeps through, that area itself may be small, as pure CO2 tends to \nger"
or \channel" between injection and production wells, bypassing some of the oil. In compar-
ison, injecting pure water increases the area that is swept, but reduces recovery from that
area. Reservoir-engineering studies4 indicate that both oil recovery and CO2 sequestration
are maximized when a mix of CO2 and water is injected (whereby the CO2 fraction that
maximizes oil recovery typically diers from that maximizing sequestration).
Our paper provides an evaluation of the role of all ve factors. We start by developing
a theoretical framework that analyzes the dynamic co-optimization of oil extraction and CO2
sequestration, through the producer's choice at each point in time of an optimal CO2 fraction
in the injection stream (the control variable). The decision to cease extraction is determined
by a transversality condition. Both the injection and termination decisions depend in part
on the anticipated price of oil and the carbon tax or credit price. The paper concludes with a
series of simulations that are based on an ongoing project, namely the Lost Soldier-Tensleep
eld in Wyoming. These simulations generate time paths of CO2 injection and implied time
paths of oil production and CO2 sequestration, for a range of oil prices and carbon taxes. A
key nding is that cumulative sequestration is positively related to the oil price, and is in
fact much more responsive to oil-price increases than to increases in the carbon tax.
4See, e.g., Al-Shuraiqi et al. (2003), Jessen et al. (2005), Juanes and Blunt (2006), Guo et al. (2006), and
Trivedi and Babadagli (2007).5
2. The Model
Our model of oil production is based on the physical reality that input injections (water,
gas, or some mixture of the two) must balance with uid output (oil, water, and gas).5 In
addition, the rate of oil production is linked to remaining reserves by the so-called \decline
curve."
6 This relation species output as a particular fraction of remaining reserves, where
that fraction is itself linked to the fraction of CO2 in the injection stream. Upon specifying
the relation between rate of CO2 injection and oil production we may write down the formal
dynamic optimization model, which we then use to describe the time path of CO2 injection.
Ultimately, this allows us to describe the rate of CO2 that is sequestered at every point in
time, and thereby to determine the total amount sequestered.
We begin with some notation. Let the rate of CO2 injection at time t be c(t), and
the rate of water injection be hi(t). We assume the total rate of injection, I  c(t)+hi(t), is
constant across time. This reects the fact that CO2-EOR projects are usually operated at
\minimum miscibility pressure," which is the minimum pressure required to make the CO2
mix with the oil. Maintaining that pressure requires a roughly constant overall injection
rate.
Let the rate of oil production at time t be q(t), the rate of CO2 production (or
\leakage") at time t be `(t), and the rate of water production at time t be hp(t). Materials
balance then requires that
q(t) + l(t) + hp(t) = c(t) + hi(t)
at each point in time (with both sums equaling I). In practice, the leaked CO2 could be
vented or recycled. Let the price of a unit of newly purchased CO2 equal ws and the unit
cost of recycling CO2 equal w`. We assume that ws > w`, so that it is always cheaper for the
5Reservoir engineers refer to this as \materials balance." It should be noted that this requirement applies
at the temperature and pressure conditions that obtain inside the reservoir. At these conditions, CO2 exists
in a highly compressed, \supercritical" state and behaves much like a liquid.
6Fetkovitch (1980) provides an in-depth discussion of decline curves, and of the justication for their wide-
spread use in predicting oil production from reservoirs.6
rm to recycle than to vent.7 As a result, all leakage is re-injected and total CO2 injection
is the sum of new purchases and leakage, or
c(t) = s(t) + `(t): (1)
The rate at which CO2 is sequestered depends on the linkage between injected CO2
and produced oil. We assume that the fraction of oil production displaced by CO2 (as opposed
to that displaced by water) is proportional to the fraction of CO2 in the total injection stream.
We also assume that sequestered CO2 takes up the underground space vacated by the oil
that it displaces. To simplify the exposition, units of oil are chosen such that in the reservoir,
vacating the space taken up by one unit of oil creates space for sequestering exactly one unit
of CO2. As a result, we have s(t) = c(t)q(t)=I. As we are focusing on an individual rm and
a particular oil reservoir, we may normalize so that I = 1. Accordingly,
s(t) = c(t)q(t): (2)
At any point in time, the amount of recoverable oil is R(t); we write the initial amount
of oil at the moment the EOR project is undertaken as R0. As usual, this variable plays the
role of the state variable in our analysis, and it evolves via
_ R =  q: (3)
In keeping with the physical reality of oil recovery, we assume that the rate of production can
be described by a decline curve: q(t) = R(t). In our setting, however, the ratio of output to
reserves|which plays the role of the decline rate|is linked to the rate of injection:  = (c).
7In practice, the purchase price of CO2 is several times higher than the cost of recycling. Thus, rms
undertaking EOR do generally recycle CO2. Importantly, the presence of a carbon price  does not change
the relevant comparison: the cost of a newly purchased unit becomes ws   (as the seller of the CO2 avoids
the carbon tax or receives a credit for sequestering), while the opportunity cost of recycling becomes w`  
(as venting would obligate the producer to pay the carbon tax or purchase a credit). Note, however, the
implicit assumption that competition between CO2 sellers will induce them to pass on the full savings on
the tax or value of the credit to the EOR buyer. In light of the fact (discussed further in the concluding
section of the paper) that aggregate CO2 emissions currently far outstrip all estimates of aggregate EOR
sequestration, this assumption seems reasonable.7
We therefore have the relation
q(t) = (c)R(t): (4)
Combining (3) and (4), we obtain
_ R =  (c)R: (5)
Consistent with results from the reservoir-engineering studies cited in the introduction, we
assume that the (c) function relating the rate of injection to the decline rate is concave,
with an interior maximum. If only water is used (termed a \waterood"), the decline rate
is w  (0) > 0. If only CO2 is used (termed a \pure CO2 ood"), the decline rate is (1).
We assume, consistent again with reservoir-engineering studies, that (1) > w. In light of
the concavity of (c), 0(0) > 0 > 0(1).
The economic environment depends on three ingredients: the price of oil, p; the carbon
tax, ; and operating costs.8 We assume that all costs other than those of CO2 purchases
and CO2 recycling are tied to the overall amount of uids injected and the amount of uids
produced. As both amounts are constant and equal to I, these other costs are a constant F.
Accordingly, the rm earns a rate of prots equal to
 = pq   (ws   )s   w``   F:
Using (1), (2), and (5), we may rewrite the prot rate as
 = p(c)R   [ws   ]c(c)R   w`c[1   (c)R]   F
= p(c)R   [ws      w`]c(c)R   w`c   F: (6)
Since the combustion of oil generates CO2 as a by-product, it seems reasonable to expect
that there will be a tax liability embedded within the market price. To facilitate further
discussions of the role played by the carbon tax, it will be convenient to isolate this eect in
the expression of prots. To that end, we denote the induced tax liability for a one-dollar
8Because our focus in this paper is on the optimal operation of a CO2 ood, we abstract from up-front
investments required to make an oil eld \CO2 ready." Such investments include changes in well equipment,
additions of metering equipment and pipelines in the eld, and the construction of a CO2 recycling plant that
separates produced CO2 from the oil and then dehydrates and recompresses it. We discuss likely implications
of introducing up-front investment costs in the concluding section of the paper.8
increase in the carbon tax by . This parameter combines tax incidence eects with unit
conversions associated with the transformation of a unit of produced oil into carbon units.
Adjusting (6) to take account of these aspects, we may write the rate of prots as
 = (p   )(c)R   [ws      w`]c(c)R   w`c   F:
To save on notation, we will typically summarize the combination p    as Y and the
combination ws      w` as Z. Using this notational convention, the prot rate is
 = Y (c)R   Zc(c)R   w`c   F:
3. Analysis
The goal of the rm is to choose a time path of the injection rate c(t) so as to maximize
its present discounted value, subject to the state equation (5), the initial value of the state
variable, R0, and the constraints 0  c  1, R  0. Both the terminal time T and the
terminal stock R(T) are free, and so the optimal choices of these values will be governed by
transversality conditions. To solve this dynamic optimization problem, we rst dene the
current-value Hamiltonian
H =    mq = Y (c)R   Zc(c)R   w`c   F   m(c)R; (7)
where m is the current-value multiplier (shadow price) associated with a unit of oil in situ.
The optimal path of extraction satises the maximum principle, which consists of
the state equation, an equation for identifying the optimal extraction rate at a given point
in time, and an equation of motion for the shadow price. If the optimal extraction rate is
described by an interior solution, we have
Hc = (Y   Zc   m)
0(c)R   Z(c)R   w` = 0; (8)
where Hc = @H=@c. Irrespective of whether the optimal value of c is described by an interior
solution, the state equation is given by (5), and the equation of motion for the shadow price9
is
_ m = rm   (Y   Zc   m)(c): (9)
The right-hand side of equation (9) diers from the standard Hotelling representation by
virtue of the second set of terms. These terms capture the fact that current carbon injec-
tions reduce the productive capability of future injections. The value associated with this
induced diminution of the future production rate is the product of the marginal impact of
the production rate on the current-value Hamiltonian (Y  Zc m) and the current decline
rate ((c)).
Because the end time is free, the value of the current-value Hamiltonian at the ter-
minal time T must be zero. As the end state is free, the product of the shadow price and
the state variable at the terminal time must also be zero: m(T)R(T) = 0. As the extraction
rate is proportional to the stock, we infer from (7) that the prot rate must be zero at time
T. But for that to happen there must be positive revenues, which in turn requires a positive
production rate. It follows that the terminal stock is positive, so that the terminal value of
the shadow price must be zero.
We now turn to a discussion of the time path of injection. Assuming an interior
solution over an interval, we may time-dierentiate (8) to get
_ c = [ Hcm _ m   HcR _ R]=Hcc;
where Hcx = @2H=@c@x, x = m;c, or R. From (8), we see that Hcm =  0(c)R and
HcR = (Y   Zc   m)0(c)   Z(c) = w`=R (where we use (8) to extract the last relation).
Combining these observations with the state equation, we get
_ c = [
0(c)R _ m + w`(c)]=Hcc: (10)
At an interior solution, the denominator is negative and the second term within square
brackets is positive. It follows that injection is falling at any moment where 0(c) _ m is
positive; if it is negative, the sign of _ c is ambiguous.10
To further explore the time path of c, we combine (8) and (9) to get

0(c)R _ m + w`(c) = [r
0(c)m   Z(c)
2]R: (11)
Comparing (10) and (11), it is apparent that a sucient condition for _ c to be negative
is for the right-hand side of (11) to be positive. This will occur, for example, if 0 > 0
and Z is not large and positive, or if Z is negative and large in magnitude. Heuristically,
0 > 0 is consistent with the notion of restraining current production so as to allow rents
to rise over time, which seems plausible. For Z to be small is a bit less obvious. Recall
that Z = ws      w`, and that by assumption ws   w` > 0. If ws   w` is small, which
is the case in our simulations and seems to be the empirically important case, then Z will
be small irrespective of the size of the carbon tax. On the other hand, if the carbon tax is
particularly large, then Z will be negative. On balance, then, the right-hand side of (11) will
be positive in a range of cases that seem empirically relevant. As such, the rate of injection
will commonly be declining.
The preceding discussion focuses on interior solutions. While these will be common,
there are circumstances under which corner solutions obtain. We now discuss those condi-
tions. First, suppose the optimal rate of CO2 injection is zero (i.e., it is optimal to undertake
a waterood); in that case Hc  0 when evaluated at c = 0. The condition of interest is
(Y   m)
0(0)R   ZwR   ws  0:
Because m and R do not change discontinuously, if this condition holds with strict inequality
at a particular moment t, it must hold for an interval of time following t. Accordingly, during
this interval the optimal level of c remains equal to zero. It follows that during this interval
_ Hc =  
0(0)[R _ m   (Y   m) _ R]   Zw _ R;
or, upon using (5),
_ Hc =  







Combining (9) and (12), taking note of the fact that c = 0, we deduce that




The important thing to note here is that for negative values of Z, or values of Z that are
positive but relatively small in magnitude, the right-hand side of (13) will be non-positive; as
we noted above, this restriction does not seem to be terribly demanding. In such a scenario,
once Hc becomes negative, it tends to stay negative. We conclude that it will be typical for
the corner solution c = 0 to remain in eect once it is initiated.
Now suppose the optimal rate of CO2 injection is one (i.e., it is optimal to undertake
a pure CO2 ood); in that case Hc  0 when evaluated at c = 1. The condition of interest is
(Y   Z   m)
0(1)R   Z(1)R   ws  0:
As with the c = 0 corner solution, if this condition holds with strict inequality, it must apply
for an interval of time; during that interval we have
_ Hc =  [rm
0(1)   Z(1)
2]R: (14)
As noted above, the only way this corner solution can obtain is if Z is negative and large
in magnitude. On the other hand, 0(1) < 0. Thus, depending on the relative magnitudes
of Z and m, Hc can either be rising or falling. Importantly, as m is likely to fall over
time, eventually _ Hc will become negative. It follows that the pure CO2 ood cannot last
indenitely: at some point, it will be optimal to adopt an interior solution.
Our model thus predicts that under most conditions, from the point at which a
CO2 ood is initiated, CO2 injection will be non-increasing over time until it reaches zero.
After this, a pure waterood will continue until the ow prots are equal to the ow xed
costs, at which time extraction activity ceases. This endogenous endpoint occurs when
the shadow value reaches zero. The initial value of carbon injection, the rate of decline of
injection over time, the point at which a pure waterood begins and ends, and the total
amounts of oil production and carbon sequestration will be determined by eld-specic12
physical characteristics that determine the  function and the initial state R. Of course, they
will also be aected by the oil price and carbon tax, which dene the economic environment.
4. Simulation Framework
In order to add greater context to the results derived above, we have solved and simulated
the model numerically to yield optimal time paths of carbon injection rates for various
combinations of oil price and carbon tax. Below we rst discuss the solution algorithm and
then present results.
The optimization problem is reasonably straightforward, in that it involves a single
control variable, CO2 injection c, which is optimized given a single state variable, remaining
physical reserves R. We used two approaches to solving the problem, which (up to rounding
errors) yielded identical results. The rst approach was a brute-force determination of the
optimal time path of c. In this approach, a discretized version of the control problem was
programmed. Time was divided into discrete periods t = 0;:::;T for a large time horizon
T, and the function c(t) was approximated by the T +1 values ct that maximize the present
value of prots, subject to the (discretized) state equation and bounds on c. Simultaneously,
the optimal terminal period T was solved for as well.
In the second approach, the problem was solved by again rst converting it to discrete
time and then using an algorithm that iterates on an approximation to the solution to the
Bellman equation. Here, the solution to the dynamic program is computed using a neural-
network approximation dened over a nite set of grid points distributed within the state
space.9
Let V (R) denote the optimal value function:
V (R) = max
c Y (c)R   Zc(c)R   w`c   F + V (R   (c)R): (15)
9A one-hidden-layer feedforward neural network as is used in this algorithm provides a uniform approxima-
tion to any continuous, multivariate function to any desired degree of accuracy. For a detailed discussion of
neural networks see Hassoun (1995), page 46.13
I 1 overall rate of injection and production (1 million barrels)
R0 1 initial stock of oil in reservoir (1 million barrels)
ws 4 per-barrel cost of purchased CO2
w` 1 per-barrel cost of separating and recycling \leaked" CO2
F 0.1 xed costs ($1 million)
 2.2 incidence of the carbon tax on the oil producer
r 0.05 discount rate
w 0.06 intercept of (c) function
1 0.20 rst coecient of (c) function
2 0.16 second coecient of (c) function
Table 1. Baseline parameter values.
Write (Rj) as a neural-network approximation of V (R) with parameter values . The
algorithm consists of 5 steps:
1. Draw a distribution of grid points in R space.
2. Begin with an initial guess of 0(R) = 0;8R and solve (15) given this guess at each
grid point. Denote the solution to this iteration by V 1(R).
3. Compute the approximation for iteration i = 1;2;::: by solving minf(Rj)  
V i(R)g2 and denote the solution i(R).
4. Solve V i+1 = maxc Y (c)R   Zc(c)R   w`c   F + i(R   (c)R).
5. Return to step 3 unless jjV i(R)   V i 1(R)jj < 10 6.
The nal approximation, (R;), represents an approximate solution to the dynamic pro-
gram.
We compute the solution for scenarios with oil prices of $100, $200, and $300 per
barrel (bl), taking $100/bl as our baseline price, and for carbon taxes of $0, $40, $80, and
$120 per tonne of CO2 (tCO2), taking the absence of any tax as our baseline. Table 1 shows
the baseline parameter values of the numerical model. All quantity ows are in units of
1 million \reservoir" barrels (rb) per year (1 barrel= 42 gallons (US)  0:16m3), meaning
barrels at the temperature and pressure conditions that obtain inside the reservoir. Overall
injection I is normalized to 1 million such barrels.
The initial stock of oil in the reservoir, R0 is set at 1 million barrels as well. For
comparison, the Lost Soldier{Tensleep (LSTP) EOR project in Wyoming injects about 4414
million barrels per year, and extrapolating the decline curve for its oil production since
starting the CO2 ood suggests that ultimately about 36 million barrels of oil would be
recovered over the course of that ood were it to be continued forever. In eect, then, our
simulation applies a scaling factor of about 1/40 to the LSTP project.
The various cost parameters of the model are based on a variety of sources, including
data presented in McCoy (2008) and EIA (2007), as well as personal communication with
industry experts.10 Oil producers commonly measure CO2 in units of 1,000 cubic feet (mcf)
at standard surface temperature and pressure conditions. In Wyoming, the purchase price
of CO2 is currently about $2 per mcf. To convert this price to reservoir barrels, we have
to take account of the fact that the CO2 is greatly compressed when it is injected into
the reservoir. At LSTP, the compression factor (referred to by reservoir engineers as the
\formation volume factor for CO2") is 0.471 rb/mcf (which, since 1 mcf corresponds to
about 178 barrels, amounts to a compression rate of about 380 times). Rounding this factor
up to 0.5, we end up with a gross CO2 purchase price ws of $4/rb. We take the unit cost w`
of separating and recycling \leaked" CO2 that is mixed in with the produced oil to be on
the order of $0.50/mcf, or $1/rb.
It is important to note at this point that, although we express carbon taxes throughout
the paper in terms of dollars per tCO2, for conformity with the other prices in the model
(P, ws and w`) the parameter  is expressed in dollars per rb. Since one tCO2 corresponds
to about 19.05 mcf, the above-mentioned conversion factor for LSTP of 0.5 mcf/rb results
in a combined conversion factor of 9.5 rb/tCO2, which we round up to 10. In other words,
a carbon tax of $40/tCO2 translates to a per-barrel tax of $4.
Operating costs unrelated to injection or recycling of CO2 amount to about $24,000
per well per year in non-injection or production-related expenses, plus about $0.0125 per
barrel of overall injection or production. Applying our scaling factor of 1/40 to LSTP's total
of about 110 active wells, each producing or injecting about 800,000 rb per year, this works
out to xed costs F of about $0.1 million dollars per year.
10In particular, Charles Fox of Kinder Morgan, Inc., and Mark Nicholas of Nicholas Consulting Group.15
As noted above, the parameter , which describes carbon-tax incidence on oil pro-
ducers, is actually a combination of tax incidence eects and unit conversions that transform
a unit of produced oil into carbon units. Tax incidence eects depend on demand and supply
elasticities. Based on estimates by Gately and Huntington (2002) of the long-run elasticity
of oil demand and by Gately (2004) of the long-run elasticity of non-OPEC oil supply, we
set the tax incidence on producers of a given tax expressed in dollars per barrel of oil at
55%. Based on data reported in EPA (2007), we estimate the quantity of CO2 generated by
combusting one barrel of oil at around 0.4tCO2, or 4rb. Multiplying this by the incidence of
55%, and recalling that  in the numerical model is expressed in dollars per rb, we end up
with a combined incidence parameter of  = 2:2.11
Lastly, the parameters of (c) function are based on a combination of production
experience at LSTP and simulation results in the literature. The decline rate of overall
oil production at LSTP since it started its CO2 ood in 1989 is about 11.5%, whereby
the fraction of CO2 in overall injection has been held roughly constant over time at 0.35.
Also, simulation data based on data from an oil eld in China indicate that, compared to
cumulative oil recovery after six years of injecting pure water, recovery after six years of
injecting a mix of half CO2, half water is higher by a factor of two, while recovery after six
years of injecting pure CO2 is higher by a factor of ve-thirds (Guo et al.; 2006). These data
are consistent with a quadratic (c) function
(c) = w + 1c   2c
2
with parameters w = 0:06, 1 = 0:2, and 2 = 0:16.
Figure 1 shows the initial rates of oil production ((c)R0) and CO2 sequestration
(c(c)R0) implied by this parameterization. The important thing to note is that initial
injection rates above 0.625 million barrels/year are counter-productive to oil recovery, but
still increase sequestration.
11Because estimates of demand and supply elasticities for oil, and thereby of the tax incidence, are subject
to considerable uncertainty, we have performed some sensitivity analysis on this parameter. We nd that,
even in the two extreme cases where the incidence is zero, so that  = 0 also, and where the incidence is
100%, so that  = 4, our results are essentially unchanged.16










































Figure 1. Initial oil production and CO2 sequestration as a function of the
initial CO2 injection rate.
It should be emphasized that, although there are good reasons to believe that the (c)
function is concave,12 its precise shape for any given reservoir is likely to strongly depend on
geological properties such as permeability, thickness, and heterogeneity of the reservoir rock.
The particular parameterization used here should therefore be viewed as only illustrative.
5. Simulation Results
The rst element of behavior that we wish to dene is the optimal extraction and sequestra-
tion path for our benchmark assumptions. Here, we use an oil price of $100 with no carbon
tax. Panel (a) of Figure 2 shows the optimal paths of CO2 injection (c), CO2 leakage (`), oil
production (q), and ow CO2 sequestration (s).
The optimal initial injection rate is 0.485 million barrels/year, somewhat smaller
than either the instantaneous oil-production maximizing rate of 0.625 or the myopic prot-
maximizing injection rate of 0.582. This reects the producer's tradeos of current against
future extraction, and of oil revenues against CO2 injection costs. Note also that a large
fraction (initially about 88%) of the injected CO2 resurfaces with the produced oil and must
be recycled. As oil production declines over time from its initial rate of 0.119 million bar-
rels/year, the producer's revenues decline as well, as does CO2 sequestration in the space
12See the reservoir-engineering studies cited in footnote 4.17






































































Figure 2. CO2 injection, leakage, and sequestration, and oil production (a)
and the shadow price (b) over time.
vacated by the oil. As a result, CO2 leakage, and thereby recycling costs, would increase
over time even if the producer chose to hold CO2 injection constant. This changing bal-
ance between oil revenues and recycling costs makes it optimal for the producer to instead
gradually reduce the injection rate over time, as predicted by the theory.
After 22 years, the optimal CO2 injection rate drops to zero, at which point the
producer switches to a pure waterood, thereby completely avoiding CO2 injection costs.
From that point in time forward, prots consist of the (declining) oil revenues less xed
costs. These remain positive for another 31 years, after which the eld is shut down.
Panel (b) of the gure shows the corresponding path of the shadow price. Consistent
with our analysis in the previous section, the shadow price declines throughout, reaching its
terminal value of zero after 53 years.
5.1. Eects of oil price
Our investigation of the comparative dynamics of the model starts with the eect of higher
oil prices. Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows how the optimal CO2 injection path changes as the oil
price level is raised from $100 to $300/bl. Panel (c) of Figure 3 shows how the optimal time
path of oil production changes with price; for reference, we also plot the time path under
a pure water ood. The higher resulting oil revenues make it optimal to initially raise the18




























































































































































Figure 3. Change in (a) CO2 injection, (b) cumulative sequestration, (c) oil
production, and (d) cumulative oil production paths as a result of oil price
changes.
CO2 injection rate, bringing it closer to the output-maximizing level. However, because even
at the baseline price of $100, initial revenues are already very high relative to CO2-related
costs, baseline oil production is already very close to its revenue-maximizing rate at each
point in time. Raising the price therefore has a negligible eect on the oil production path,
as is evident from panel (c) of the graph; it also has a negligible eect on cumulative oil19






























































Figure 4. CO2 sequestration and oil production, both cumulative (a) and
annualized (b), as a function of the oil price.
production, as shown in panel (d). Nevertheless, the fact that the oil is produced with a more
CO2-rich injection mix implies that cumulative sequestration over the productive lifetime of
the eld increases, as shown in panel (b).
Figure 4 shows oil supply and resulting CO2 sequestration as a function of the oil
price. Panel (a) shows cumulative levels of both, whereas panel (b) shows the annualized
equivalent.13 Note that CO2 sequestration supply drops to zero at at a price of $12/bl,
below which incremental oil revenues from CO2 injection no longer justify the higher variable
costs.14 At lower prices, the producer therefore optimally operates the eld as a waterood,
resulting in zero sequestration and in slower oil extraction. Once the price drops below
$1.70/bl, oil revenues no longer cover the operating costs of a waterood either, making it
optimal to not operate the eld at all.
13The annualized values are calculated as the constant rate s or q that, when multiplied by the relevant
price  or p, would over an innite time horizon yield the same present value as the actual, time-varying







and q is dened analogously.
14Recall that we abstract from up-front capital costs associated with CO2 injection. Implicitly, we assume
that at time 0 these costs have already been incurred, and are sunk.20
Note also that at prices of $50/bl and higher, changes in the price of oil have almost
no eect on oil output: at the baseline price of $100, the elasticity of cumulative output is
0.01, while that of annualized output is 0.04. This point is consistent with the result shown
in panels (c) and (d) of Figure 3: at these high oil prices, operating costs become so small
relative to oil revenues that the optimal oil extraction path is very close to the optimal path
that would obtain if costs were zero (i.e., the revenue-maximizing path). Nevertheless, as
shown in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3, higher oil prices do induce substantially higher
rates of CO2 injection, and thereby sequestration. As a result, the sequestration curves in
Figure 4 are substantially more elastic: at the baseline price of $100, the cross-price elasticity
of cumulative sequestration is 0.52, while that of annualized sequestration is 0.47.
5.2. Eects of carbon tax
We continue our investigation of the comparative dynamics of the model with the eect of
higher carbon taxes. Such taxes reduce both the net-of-tax oil price received by the producer
and the net-of-tax input price of CO2. However, at a given injection rate c(t), the change
in oil revenues from a marginal tax change is is  q(t)d, whereas the change in input costs
is  c(t)q(t)d. As long as c(t) is below its upper bound of 1, the revenue eect therefore
dominates, in which case the rm is motivated to move the injection schedule forward in
time. Indeed, panel (a) of Figure 5 shows that the optimal initial injection rate increases in
the tax rate. However, it also shows that the optimal time to switch to pure water injection is
accelerated. As a result, injection rates decline more rapidly over time the higher is the tax.
Even so, the overall eect of higher carbon taxes on cumulative sequestration is positive, as
shown in panel (b). Panels (c) and (d) show that oil production tends to be insensitive to the
level of the carbon tax, which coincides with our earlier observation that revenue eects from
oil sales tend to be more important than input costs in driving the rm's output decisions.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that at the highest tax level considered in the g-
ure, namely $120/tCO2, the initial injection rate in panel (a) slightly exceeds the output-
maximizing rate of 0.625 million bl/year; further increases in the tax level would raise the
initial injection rate to even higher levels. Because such high tax levels make the net CO221
































































































































































Figure 5. Change in (a) CO2 injection, (b) cumulative sequestration, (c) oil
production, and (d) cumulative oil production paths as a result of carbon tax
changes.
price strongly negative, CO2 injection is optimally pushed to levels where its marginal eect
on oil production becomes negative as well, thereby reducing initial oil production. In eect,
the producer sacrices oil output and revenues early on in return for higher sequestration
revenues that result from higher initial CO2 injection rates. Very high tax rates, in other
words, induce a tradeo between maximizing oil revenues and sequestration revenues.22


































































Figure 6. CO2 sequestration and oil production, both cumulative (a) and
annualized (b), as a function of the carbon tax.
Figure 6 shows CO2 sequestration supply and associated oil output as a function of
the carbon tax. Because the oil extraction paths are very close to their revenue-maximizing
values regardless of the level of the carbon tax, oil output is almost perfectly inelastic with
respect to the carbon tax. More surprising is that the sequestration supply curves are quite
inelastic as well. At the current European tax level of about $40/tCO2, the elasticity of
cumulative sequestration is only 0.05, and that of annualized sequestration only 0.06. Even
at much higher taxes, up to $400/tCO2, these elasticities never exceed 0.55.
5.3. Eects of oil price and carbon tax combined
To recap, the results of subsection 5.1 suggest that the rates of CO2 injection and seques-
tration are both relatively responsive to higher oil prices. The result is larger levels of
cumulative sequestration at higher prices. On the other hand, the results of subsection 5.2
indicate that higher carbon-tax levels increase the optimal CO2 injection rate early on, but
reduce it later, with the same qualitative eects on the induced CO2 sequestration rate.
The initial increase in sequestration dominates, however, resulting in higher overall levels of
cumulative sequestration. Even so, the net impact is relatively small, so that cumulative
sequestration is relatively unresponsive to higher carbon taxes.23
In this subsection, we briey consider combined changes in oil price and carbon tax,
to look for possible interaction eects. Panel (a) of Figure 7 shows optimal CO2 injection
at four oil price/carbon tax combinations, namely oil prices of $100/bl and $200/bl, with
carbon taxes of $40/tCO2 and $80/tCO2. At the time of writing, current oil prices are about
$100/bl, while the current carbon price in the European market is about $40/tCO2. Thus,
one can interpret the variations as corresponding to a doubling of current prices. The plots
in panel (a) suggest a negative interaction eect: at both oil prices, a doubling of the carbon
tax tilts the injection path forward in time, but the eect is smaller at the higher oil price.
As a result, the increment in cumulative sequestration, shown in panel (b), is smaller as well.
The more obvious point to take away from this gure, however, is that both CO2
injection and cumulative sequestration are far less sensitive to the carbon tax than to the
oil price. While a doubling of the carbon tax does tilt the CO2 injection path forward, and
does increase the ultimate amount of sequestered carbon, these eects pale by comparison
with the impacts due to a doubling of the oil price.
The interesting|and somewhat paradoxical|implication is that for CO2-EOR projects,
high oil prices are much more potent incentives for sequestration than are high carbon taxes.
The reason is that higher oil prices induce the rm to signicantly increase CO2 injection
throughout the lifetime of the CO2 ood, so as to bring oil production even closer to its
physical maximum rate than it already is. As a result, a greater fraction of the space in the
reservoir vacated by the produced oil is taken up by CO2 rather than water. The higher
sequestration, in other words, arises essentially as an unintended by-product, or side eect,
of the higher oil production.
As noted in subsection 5.2, it is only at very high carbon-tax levels that sequestration
revenues start to compete with oil revenues, driving the rm to increase CO2 injection beyond
the output-maximizing rate.24
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Figure 7. CO2 time paths of injection (a) and cumulative sequestration (b),
for various combinations of oil price and carbon tax.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined how the standard resource-economics problem of optimizing
the rate of oil extraction from a eld is altered when the producer has the option of increasing
the rate of oil extraction through continuous injections of a mix of CO2 and water into the
reservoir. Our focus in the paper is on the producer's problem of determining the optimal
CO2 injection rate over time and thus the eects of carbon taxes and oil prices on oil
production and carbon sequestration.
Our theoretical analysis of this problem indicates that the optimal CO2 injection rate
will typically decline over time, and may eventually drop to zero before it becomes optimal
to terminate the extraction process. Numerical simulations conrm these results and allow
us to further investigate comparative dynamics of the model.
Our simulation results suggest good news and bad news for potential carbon seques-
tration from EOR. The bad news is that EOR-based carbon sequestration appears to be
highly inelastic to carbon taxes. As such, there is little hope that policies raising the cost of
CO2 emissions will induce large increases in EOR-based sequestration. The good news is that25
market conditions favoring high oil prices are likely to induce such increases in sequestration,
essentially as a by-product of producers' attempts to increase oil output.
Of course, the apparent inelasticity of EOR-based carbon sequestration at the in-
dividual well level need not imply inelastic supply at a more aggregated level. Moreover,
because oil reservoirs are generally not spatially homogeneous with respect to relevant physi-
cal parameters such as thickness, permeability, and integrity of the cap rock, it is conceivable
that EOR would be attractive in some sections of a reservoir, but not others, for a given
combination of economic parameters.15 In such a scenario, the supply of sequestration ser-
vices for the oil reservoir might be less inelastic to the carbon price than our results indicate.
Additionally, if one imagines comparing across dierent reservoirs, it seems likely that EOR
projects would come on-line at dierent combinations of oil price and carbon price. Again,
this observation suggests that the sequestration supply curve for a broader geographic entity,
such as a state or country as a whole, would likely be less inelastic than is true for the single
unit that we study.
An important caveat to the good news|the signicant responsiveness of sequestration
to oil prices|concerns a counter-balancing eect that applies at the larger geographic level,
but is insignicant at the single-unit level. Because large-scale deployment of EOR will
generally raise aggregate oil production, it will tend to reduce the market price of oil for
any given level of the carbon tax. This in turn will increase the consumption of petroleum-
based products, such as motor vehicle fuel, which will generate increased carbon emissions
in its own right. It is not clear how these additional emissions compare to the sequestration
associated with EOR, but it is conceivable that, on balance, EOR could lead to a net increase
in carbon emissions at the state or national level.
In addition, the overall sequestration capacity of EOR projects, while quite large in
absolute terms, is quite small in comparison to both overall CO2 emissions and the capacity
of other geological sequestration options. For example, the 12 GtCO2 that Dooley et al.
(2006) estimate as the theoretical sequestration capacity of all depleted U.S. oil reservoirs
15This is true, for example, of the Salt Creek eld in Wyoming, one of the largest EOR projects currently
operating in the US.26
(including those depleted through EOR) amounts to just two years' worth of U.S. CO2
emissions (EPA; 2008). In contrast, the same study estimates the theoretical sequestration
capacity of U.S. saline aquifers to be as large as 3,630 GtCO2, making clear that in the long
run, the main contribution to geological sequestration will have to come from such aquifers.
Nevertheless, these points do not imply that EOR has no positive social role to play
in promoting geological carbon sequestration. The societal importance of EOR lies in the
widely held expectation that it can provide a bridge to that long run. That is, prots
from CO2-enhanced oil output can be used to \jump-start" the building of pipelines and
other infrastructure required for ultimately much larger-scale sequestration in non-oil-bearing
formations.16
A key question we plan to address in future work is how large these EOR prots are
likely to be. Clearly, analysis of this question will require expanding our model to account for
up-front investment costs associated with converting a eld to CO2-injection. Preliminary
estimates suggest that, for a eld of the scale used in our numerical simulations, these costs
would amount to several million dollars, and that the cuto oil price (in the absence of a
carbon tax) at which incurring these costs would be justied lies around $50/bl.
A further extension concerns the eect of rising (rather than constant) oil prices and
carbon taxes on both the optimal management of a CO2 ood and the decision to initiate such
a ood. In a stationary economic environment, there is never an incentive to delay switching
to EOR|if doing so is not protable at time 0, it will never be. Increasing prices may well
induce such delay, however. Geologically heterogeneous projects will make the switch at
dierent cuto prices, thereby shifting out the aggregate supply of sequestration over time.
Moreover, even projects that could protably switch immediately at time 0 may optimally
16As noted by William L. Townsend, CEO of a major CO2-pipeline company, in recent Congressional
testimony: \It is clear that the long-term geologic sequestration answer to single-point, industrial CO2
emissions capture and storage is in saline aquifers, not EOR projects. That being said, there is a very
strong, cost-eective interim answer for the next ten years that employs the oil-based revenues in EOR to
subsidize the infrastructure build-out and prepare the foundation of a carbon highway for the next generation
of cost-eective CCS in power generation." (Townsend; 2007) The same view was expressed also in the
testimony by George Peridas (Peridas; 2008) and in the National Petroleum Council report (NPC; 2007)
cited in footnote 2.27
choose to delay, if doing so increases the net present value of switching.17 Interestingly, it
seems likely that the latter type of delay may have the eect of reducing sequestration in a
given reservoir. This is because the switch would occur at a lower remaining reserve stock,
leaving less oil to be replaced by CO2.
A nal complication left for future work concerns the likely endogeneity of the reserve
stock to CO2 injections. By reducing the viscosity of reservoir oil, CO2 injections may not
only enhance the rate at which a given reserve stock can be extracted, but also increase the
stock itself. That is, oil that is impossible to ush out with a waterood|referred to by reser-
voir engineers as \stranded" oil|may become recoverable once it mixes with CO2. Clearly,
this reserve-enhancing eect of CO2 injections is likely to not be instantaneous, however, but
rather tied to the cumulative amount of CO2 injected. Modeling it would therefore require
introducing cumulative injection as second state variable, thereby signicantly complicating
the analysis. How, if at all, this might alter the qualitative conclusions of the present paper
is an open question.
17This is conceivable even if oil prices rise at rates below the discount rate, because the ability to delay
up-front investments implies that rents may increase faster.28
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